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Type of bind: Paperback
Dewey Decimal Number: 350.0072
EAN num: 9780029227916
ISBN number: 0029227917
Label: Free Press
Manufacturer: Free Press
Quantity: 1
Page Count: 352
Printing Date: January 25, 1988
Publishing house: Free Press
Sale Popularity Level: 49702
Studio: Free Press
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Rated by buyers 
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This is a great guide for a government staffer. If what you do is help a senior executive decision maker there are a number of cases and examples of how history can be used properly to aid decision making.
Neustadt and May taught a classic course at the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government and this is the text that resulted.
I find it extremely useful in my own work. Worth reading for anyone who helps a senior leader make decisions and take action.
Rated by buyers 
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I have to admit I'm not finished reading this book and generally hate reviews that haven't read the entire book. But this time there's a particular reason why I'm writing this review now.
That reason is that the very first sentence in this book is: "They're too busy. Can't read what they get now" referring to leaders and decision-makers, the very people this book is intended to help. Apparently the authors didn't take the VERY FIRST line in their own book to heart. Perhaps in a bizarre endeavor to prove the mediocrity of anything done by committee the authors have written a ridiculously convoluted, meandering, unorganized, semi-pointless, quasi-sort-of history book, that really, really, REALLY takes it time to get to it's sort-of point. If you ever want to be completely befuddled as to how Harvard -supposedly the best university in the world- picks its professors just read the like 12 pages too long and completely pointless preface to this book. Just as Jeremy Rifkin's total bunk has taken the sheen off of Wharton for me, these two have achieved the same sizing down for Haw-vad.
Anyway, from what I can tell so far you can read the two very good spotlight reviews -whose authors fortunately seemed to enjoy the book a good deal- and get the entire point of the book without actually having to buy or read it. Otherwise the actual meat and potatoes of the book is: One (and the authors even admit to this point in their preface!!) not very good history (the authors admit to it being "tight" and scaled down) of selected case studies, which actually don't even support their method of using history. (At the end of the very very first case study on the Cuban Missile Crisis, supposedly the sucess story to grab your attention and show the uses of history, the authors summarize by stating that the crisis was probably a sucess purely by accident, and that some of the supposedly wonderful decisions made by Kennedy and his advisor were even made on the basis of AVOIDING history! So remember kids, go ahead and avoid history sometimes, use it other times, and poof, by accident, history will help you to . . . err . . . do, um . . . well, I forgot.) And two, a bunch of platitudes like you should study history "carefully" (as opposed to carelessly I guess . . .), thinking can improve things on the margin (I'll be sure to start thinking now and see if I can earn a couple more percent a year), and you should look before you leap, and, like, wait 30 minutes before swimming after you eat your sandwich, and if you don't touch your tuna casserole it's going to get cold, and . . .
I might continue reading this thing, but right now it's a lot of work for very little payoff, and I've got better things to do with my time. It's too bad because I really do believe history is important in forming good decisions, but this book just isn't reaching me on how to read and use history.
Rated by buyers 
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A few years ago, I was assigned to read this book for a course in my MA War Studies programme at King's College London.
This book was utterly unreadable. I am still unable to fathom how professors at Harvard could produce such convoluted nonsense.
There is no 'quick and easy' method to master the use of history when making decisions. I pity those who would seek to discover such a chimera in this book.
Rated by buyers -
For years, Richard Neustadt and Ernest May taught a course in Decision Making at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. It must have been one heck of a course.
The subtitle of this book is "The Uses of History for Decision-Makers." That could actually be broadened a bit to something like "The Uses of Precedents and Analogies for Decision-Makers."
Remember when we were debating going to war in Iraq? How many times did you hear the precedent of Viet Nam invoked?
And, if you're old enough, remember Viet Nam? How many times did you hear about Munich?
How many times in business have you heard a colleague invoke a historical precedent to justify a particular course of action?
We use historical precedents and analogies all the time. Most of the time we use them as if history repeats itself. It doesn't.
Mark Twain's aphorism captures best what really happens. "History does not repeat, but it does rhyme." This book will give you tools that you can use to sort out what's the same (the rhymes) and what's different and then use your analysis to make better decisions.
The authors introduce you to methods that will help you sort things out in all kinds of different situations. They teach you about separating "facts" into known, unknown, and presumed. They discuss analyzing precedents that you're about to base a decision on in terms of likes and differences from the current situation.
By itself, no individual idea or tool is unique. None of this is rocket science. But the authors give you a systematic application of common sense and proven techniques. That system gives you power.
There are lots of little "sidebar" points as well. For example, there's the Goldberg Rule.
That rule tells you not to ask, "What's the problem?" Instead ask, "What's the story?" I picked up that technique from this book when I very first read it years ago and I've used it ever since in my consulting work and research. Try it. You'll like it.
There's also Dr. Alexander's question, which: "What fresh facts, if at hand, by when, would cause you to change your presumption?" Instead of presumption, you can insert direction, or recommendation. This simple question forces decision-makers in a group to look at underlying assumptions and to look at when those assumptions need to be changed. It, too, is simple and powerful.
The techniques in this book will definitely help you sharpen your decision-making skills. But there's an added benefit for you if you're a history buff. You'll enjoy the anecdotes and analysis of historical events, such as The Bay of Pigs, where one of the authors was an advisor.
There are a lot of books on decision-making. This is the only one I'm aware of that deals clearly and systematically with the use of precedent and historical analogy.
Rated by buyers -
As an avid reader of history, I've long struggled with putting my learning to use in day-to-day situations, whether that be in evaluating critical business decisions or in helping me better observe and understand the world around me. On the one hand, there is the familiar aphorism attributed to George Santayana that those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it. But, on the other hand, each situation is truly unique, and the use of historical analogies is clearly fraught with pitfalls. "Thinking in Time" addresses this conundrum and provides a sound basis for using historical knowledge intelligently and responsibly.
To overcome the temptation of using history incorrectly, the authors put forward a specific process for decision makers in crisis situations, and they use case studies to highlight successes and failures in the use of history as guide to decision making. The case studies are all drawn from domestic and foreign policy scenarios, but the lessons are applicable to any organization (private sector, non-profit, etc.).
The authors' decision making methodology may seem a bit didactic or formulaic at first, but it is meant to be used with the greatest flexibility. The heart of the process is to establish a system of critical inquiry and resist the temptation to jump to the "options phase" of decision making immediately. Rather, the authors argue, focus clearly on the situation at hand and confirm the intended objective. This can be started by listing what is known, what is unclear and what is presumed about the situation. Next, analogies will come to mind or will likely be invoked for advocacy (intentionally or otherwise), so quickly highlight all the "likenesses" and "differences" between the present situation and the historical analogies. This should further clarify the present situation and the intended objectives
The authors suggest other tools that, while useful, are a bit more cumbersome than separating the known from the unclear from the presumed in any given situation, which I know do religiously at work. Some of the other techniques covered include laying out a timeline of the event, including major concurrent events along with the details; asking journalistic questions (where, how, why, what, etc.) for each major event along the timeline; setting odds for given "if - then" scenarios; explicitly laying out what kind of information (new "knowns") would change your various "presumeds"; and for various options asking "For the objective of X, Y is the best option because...."
In closing, "Thinking in Time" is one of the ten most influential books I've ever read. If you are in a leadership position in business, government or even the local lodge, this book can make you a more effective leader. The only thing I regret about reading "Thinking in Time" is that I didn't do it sooner.
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