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Type of bind: Paperback
Dewey Decimal Number: 940.54214
EAN num: 9780809088546
ISBN number: 0809088541
Label: Hill and Wang
Manufacturer: Hill and Wang
Quantity: 1
Page Count: 608
Printing Date: October 03, 2001
Publishing house: Hill and Wang
Sale Popularity Level: 363811
Studio: Hill and Wang
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Editor's Notes and Comments:
Product Description:
Strange Victory is a riveting book about France and Germany in the years leading up to World War II. Why did Hitler turn against France in the Spring of 1940 and not before? And why were his poor judgement and inadequate intelligence about the Allies nonetheless correct? Why didn't France take the offensive earlier, when it might have led to victory? What explains France's failure to detect and respond to Germany's attack plan?
Skillfully weaving together decisions of the high commands with the confused responses from exhausted and ill-informed, or ill-advised, officers in the field, the distinguished diplomatic historian Ernest R. May offers many new insights into the tragic paradoxes of the battle for France.
Amazon.com Review:
The collapse of France before the German onslaught of 1940 was not, as many historians have argued, the result of the Wehrmacht's absolute superiority or the terrible fury of blitzkrieg. Indeed, writes Ernest May in Strange Victory, France had more soldiers in the field than did Germany, their arms were evenly matched in many categories and superior in many others, and the German army was far from fearless. What carried the day for the Nazi invaders was a greater imaginativeness in planning. France and its allies 'made no effort to understand how or why German thinking might differ from theirs,' did not allow for surprise, believed that their defenses would shield them, and in any event paid little attention to the intelligence that their spies brought them, including irrefutable evidence that German forces were massing along the little-defended border with Lorraine, avoiding the heavily fortified (and, May allows, highly effective) Maginot Line.
The Allies soon overcame their lack of common sense, May continues in this penetrating study, while in the wake of his French victory, Adolf Hitler 'became so sure of his own genius that he ceased to test his judgments against those of others, and his generals virtually ceased to challenge him.' The outcome is well known. Still, May suggests, Hitler's comeuppance does not diminish the lessons to be learned from the fall of France--notably, that bureaucratic arrogance, a reluctance to risk life, and a reliance on technology over tactics will quickly lose a battle. Students of realpolitik, no less than history buffs, will find much to engage them in May's book. --Gregory McNamee
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Rated by buyers -
When I bought this book, I was expecting it to be mostly about the battles which led to the conquest of France by the Germans in 1940. What I found out is that there is precious little of that. What is here is what I consider to be a scholarly analysis of the social, political, cultural, and economic factors that allowed the Germans to beat the French when it should have been the other way around.
I like May's analysis of key political figures on both sides. His assertions about them and how events were affected by them are interesting, but are they the last word? Personalities seem to have played a part in the German victory, but so did factors like allied public opinion and military command structure. I find most interesting May's assertion that Germany was on the ropes both politically and economically and that decisive allied action may have turned the tide against the Germans before they made their move.
I have read a lot of the reviews of this book and some readers strongly attack May's thesis and his methodology. Though I am widely read on the subject of WW II, I don't claim to be an expert. To me, no one book is the last word on any subject. So I will incorporate what I have learned in Strange Victory with what I already know and with what I will learn in future readings and perhaps be able to form a stronger opinion of the facts at that time.
I recommend this interesting book to anyone interested in this crucial period of world history. In Strange Victory, Ernest May gives the reader plenty to think about.
Rated by buyers -
I do share sincere disappointment one of the reviewers below about this work's dramatic and sudden discontinuation and abbreviation in regards to the actual battle for France, but the principal reason for my regret is that May's narrative is so interesting and riveting I wanted it to last forever. He is an excellent writer who knows the value of primary source materials. The quotations from Daladier, Churchill, Gamelin, Hitler, etc. enliven the work and give it a flow of which other writers would be envious. Of course, I do wish May had added an extra 100 pages and thickened the text in regards to those calamitous weeks before France surrendered.
As for the two controversial theses which make this a work of "revisionist" history. Personally, I am not persuaded that France, at any time, could have won an aggressive war against Germany because, regardless of the numbers or technological advantages here and there, they were not psychological ready or willing to conduct offensive operations in 1939 and 1940. I believe that if they had invaded during the Polish campaign they may have advanced a good ways but would ultimately have been thrown back by the Germans. His other point, concerning intelligence failures, is quite believable. France remains burdened by the same paralyzing bureaucracy yesterday and its entrenchment via socialism will sabotage their well-being for many years to come. Factually, his discusion of the SR and its relation to the military was outstanding. I highly recommend this book, and his constant referencing of the Bloch book, Strange Defeat, has resulted in my putting it on my wish list as well.
Rated by buyers 
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Strange Victory is an analysis of Germany and France from the early 1930s on, centered on the what, why, and how Plan Yellow of May 1940 unfolded. Unlike many post-WWII versions of history, this book is balanced in its treatment of France and Germany as they faced each other. The book expends extra energy to the issue of intelligence - its gathering, processing, presentation, and how it can be used to affect military operations.
The author delves into the major leaders of the crisis, their histories, and how their decisions were shaped by past and present events. Time is spent on the Austrian crisis, the Czechoslovakian crisis, the Polish invasion, the Scandinavian distraction, and the Battle of France up to late May of 1940, all from the point of view of how they affected the dynamic surrounding Plan Yellow.
Most of this book is an analysis of political history and strategy - how Chamberlain, Daladier, Reynaud, and Hitler viewed their situations and what caused them to do what they did. As May 1940 comes closer, you have an excellent military analysis of Plan Yellow - how it was formed and what caused its transformations. Issues of tank capabilities, armour tables, air force doctrine, and airplane capabilities are also presented. The best analysis is on how intelligence, counter-intelligence, and politics failed to warn the Allies of Plan Yellow, while in fact they were looking at other materials that caused them to run in the worst possible direction at the wrong time.
This book is very appreciated for its balance of treatment for all parties, which is a refreshing feature of recent revisionist histories. France was not a deck of cards waiting to fall over, and Germany was not invincible. France could fight - the battles of central Belgium are put forward as evidence of that. And Plan Yellow depended as much on the Allies lacking the right effort at the right time and right place, than the abilities of the German Army.
The book is enjoyable as it focuses everything down to the very first 5-10 days of the opening of Plan Yellow. The focus is maintained so excellently by May that it sticks to the critical phases of Plan Yellow, when the Allies had a chance of thwarting it. Readers may be disappointed that the details of the evacuation of Dunkirk and the continued fighting of France into July are not touched on, since they don't pertain to Plan Yellow's inception and what made it succeed.
I found the book to very enjoyable, balanced, and fair-minded in its analysis of the leaders and events that transpired to Plan Yellow's formation and execution. To top it off, notations and sources are listed for the skeptical reader. I would be tempted to rename the book to "Plan Yellow: How It Became A Strange Victory," because of how Ernest May maintains his focus to the material.
Rated by buyers -
I was amazed to find this book so shabbily reviewed! This is a work of brilliant scholarship and well written. One of the reviewers commented that the book is not original and that the fall of France was not strange. Originality exists on different levels. That human failings were behind the fall of France was commented upon almost immediately, beginning virtually on day one with Churchill's "The battle of France is over; the Battle of Britain must now begin" speech. But to document these failings, to detail the mistakes made, to prove that it was human failings at the heights of command in the French Army and polity, rather than equipment failures or unusual brilliance of the German high command, are no mean feat. Moreover, May's research is exhaustive. So many scholars yesterday have a theory and tailour the research to support that theory. To this they add footnotes and a lengthy bibliography to convince the reader that they have been scholarly. This is not what May has done. He has pieced together from thousands of sources a very complex story, which has enabled him to tell that story "the way it really happened." Anybody who does that, especially in this day of jet-set historians, deserves the highest accolades. I doubt that any of the reviews given here are by people with May's expertize on the subject; yet they have the temerity of to dump on him. With a work like this, the only justifiable criticism is to find factual discrepancies, citing source and page. Noticeably, there are none in the reviews submitted.
Professor May has written an excellent book and he is to be praised and congratulated on his achievement.
Rated by buyers -
The reviewers who are debating whether or not France could have won the battle are missing the larger, and more relevant point for today, namely, that poor intelligence, rigid bureaucracies and hubris led to catastrophe. When an FBI agent discovers that a Middle Eastern man wants to learn to fly a jetliner only after takeoff, yet that information doesn't work its way up to his or her superiors, the result is sadly similar. This book was published a year before 9/11. Too bad it was not required reading for all CIA and FBI personnel.
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